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Abstract:  
“In China, what makes an image true is that it is good for people to see it.”  - Susan Sontag, On Photography, 1971 
In The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau gazes down upon New York City from the 110th 
floor of the World Trade Centre and sees the island of Manhattan as an image. In particular, he witnesses 
the famous Manhattan skyline as a powerful ‘image-text’ containing a multiplicity of meanings, 
interpretations, and symbols. Considering the possibilities of the city as visual simulacrum he asks: “[i]s 
the immense texturology spread out before one’s eyes anything more than a representation; an optical 
artefact?” Twenty or so years after De Certeau wandered the streets of New York and pondered its 
pictorial power, such a perspective can be applied to Olympic and Post Olympic Beijing.  
The Olympic Games gave the world an opportunity to read Beijing’s powerful image-text following thirty 
years of rapid transformation. David Harvey argues that this transformation has turned Beijing from “a 
closed backwater, to an open centre of capitalist dynamism.”  However, in the creation of this image-text, 
another subtler and altogether very different image-text has been deliberately erased from the public gaze. 
This more concealed image-text offers a significant counter narrative on the city’s public image and 
criticises the simulacrum constructed for the 2008 Olympics, both implicitly and explicitly. It is the 
‘everyday’ image-text of a disappearing city still in the process of being bulldozed to make way for the 
neoliberal world’s next megalopolis. It exists most prominently as a filmic image text; in film 
documentaries about a ‘real’ hidden Beijing just below the surface of the government sponsored ‘optical 
artefact.’ Film has thus become a key medium through which to understand and preserve a physical city 
on the verge of erasure.  
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artefact?”1 Twenty or so years after De Certeau wandered the streets of New York and pondered its 
pictorial power, such a perspective can be applied to Olympic and Post Olympic Beijing.  
The Olympic Games gave the world an opportunity to read Beijing’s powerful image-text following thirty 
years of rapid physical and socio-economic transformation. David Harvey argues that this transformation 
has turned Beijing from “a closed backwater, to an open centre of capitalist dynamism.”2  However, in the 
creation of this image-text, another subtler, older and altogether very different image-text has been 
deliberately erased from the public gaze. This more concealed image-text offers a significant counter 
narrative on the city’s public image and criticises the virtual simulacrum constructed for the 2008 
Olympics, both implicitly and explicitly. It is the ‘everyday’ image-text of a disappearing city that is still 
in the process of being bulldozed to make way for the neoliberal world’s next megalopolis. It exists most 
prominently as a filmic image text; in film documentaries about a ‘real’ hidden Beijing just below the 
surface of the government sponsored ‘optical artefact.’ Film has thus become a key medium through 
which to understand and preserve a physical city on the verge of erasure.  
Every four years, the Olympics not only showcases sport but exhibits the political, economic and 
aesthetic prowess of its host city. In many cases, as in that of Beijing, it is used to re-brand the host as a 
‘global city.’ In the Beijing case, this formed part of a broader attempt to demonstrate China’s growing 
international status which has seen it undergo enormous, and at times complex and controversial, ‘image 
maintenance.’ In the years between winning the bid and the grand execution of the Olympic project, the 
city saw the construction of what Xuefei Ren calls, ‘new State spaces’; spaces developed entirely for the 
accommodation of ‘transnational architectural production’; the construction of buildings whose function 
was to increase the circulation of both symbolic and investment capital.3  These new, globally connected 
spaces and their ‘statescrafts,’4 were part of an interrelated urban renewal programme that helped to 
redefine Beijing’s image, integrate it into the global business community, and improve the reputation of 
the nation at large.  
Since the early days of the reform period, the creation of a visual image for Beijing as a global city has 
been an official objective. In order to adopt this “global city look,” international architects have been 
getting invited by the government to collaborate on joint venture projects for years; the aim being to 
target foreign investment and tourism. 5  In a sense, the Olympics were just the latest phase of an on-
going process that arguably injected much needed public resources into the long term project, and 
garnered public support for it at a crucial moment. It helped transform and reconfigure the city generally, 
and turned specific impoverished residential areas into gentrified hotspots - through huge infrastructural 
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investments and the development of numerous tourist and consumer spaces.  
However, issues of consent are key to ‘image maintenance’ during such phases of high profile 
development, as the acquisition of symbolic capital through the neoliberalisation of urban space has real 
tangible impacts on people’s lives. In her 2007 essay on the ‘conspicuous construction’ of an Olympic 
metropolis, Anne Marie Broudehoux claims that the Chinese government’s diversion of large sums of 
public money, resources and time, into building the spectacle of Olympic Beijing, actually contributed to 
the ‘profound inequalities that have come to epitomise China’s transition to capitalism within an 
autocratic political system.’6  She goes on to suggest that the brutality of China’s economic rise was 
highlighted with unusual clarity by the race to transform Beijing into an Olympic spectacle; as this 
spectacle depended largely on the exploitation of cheap labour, and the State’s ability to confiscate land 
from residents in the name of ‘public interest.’7  
She suggests that in securing mass compliance for its hegemonic architectural and urban reformulations, 
the Olympics was bound up with a State legislative agenda. That agenda was mobilised by political actors 
such as the media, and was intended to provide an intoxicating ‘value based discourse’ that would ‘boost 
morale,’ but which would also ‘instil fear’ into potential dissenters.8  With regard to morale, particular 
cultural and traditional values, such as nationalism and civic pride, were ‘rejuvenated with Olympic spirit’ 
to work as both a distraction, and justification, for large-scale transformations that were resulting in 
significant local upheaval. To contain dissent, and therefore ‘maintain image,’ heightened security 
measures such as an increased use of CCTV and an increased military presence on the streets, were 
brought to the fore. It was a highly visible approach to civil discipline that justified itself by placing 
emphasis on public safety and protection, but which reconfigured the question of security around 
discourses of fear. It was through a combination of these techniques, calling upon national sentiment and 
inducing fear amongst dissenters, that the huge social and spatial changes required could be carried out 
with little public scrutiny and general consent. 
Despite such spectacular efforts to mask reality and sedate the masses, resistance to changes was 
inevitable.  However, in an authoritarian state where public protest and dissent are heavily suppressed, 
struggles over such brutal changes often took place in the realm of the symbolic.9  As protest against 
global performance and representation was often carried out at a local level, it also became a struggle 
between the global and the local. Broudehoux highlights the attempts of many exploited Beijing citizens 
to draw media attention to their injustices; something particularly prevalent amongst overworked and 
unpaid construction workers and residents of demolished localities, who were forcibly evicted from their 
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homes.10  
In some cases, the only way that powerless citizens could publicly protest was by jumping off high-rise 
buildings which, at the time, became a relatively common form of suicide. It was dubbed locally tiao lou 
xia (jumping off buildings to show).11 The concept of ‘showing’ is key here, as is reclaiming the 
spectacle. The aim was to reclaim the ‘power of showing,’ or simply the ‘power of being seen.’ The 
mainstream media has the power to show, but also to not show. Censoring the presentation of these 
protests was not only key to lessening the chance for wider resistance to local developments, it was also 
analogous to the government’s ‘censoring’ of Beijing’s public face; the eviction and demolition of old, 
low-income communities literally censoring all visible signs of poverty and backwardness from the city 
centre.  
 
China’s Image Problem and Olympic Solution: The City Brand  
The Olympics, like all mega events held in large globalising cities, is about ‘being looked at.’ According 
to some commentators such as Del Olmo, Broudehoux and Poynter, hosting this kind of mega-event is 
nothing more than a conspicuous form of global competitiveness and a highly visible strategy for 
financing and accelerating urban development.12  Michel de Certeau’s perspective on Manhattan’s ‘image 
text’ in the early 1980s, underscored this idea through the phenomenon of city rebranding. In this context 
the image maintenance of New York is an attempt to fit in with, and promote, the city and its free market 
agenda.   
Following this, David Harvey regards 1970s New York City as the first global city to strategically 
reconfigure its spatial and economic landscape, to create a ‘good business climate’ that would bolster and 
sustain America’s international status.13  As with historic New York, Beijing’s economic rise in the past 
thirty years has required a redefinition of its image. That image has had to reflect the city’s, and the 
nation’s, new grand narrative of free market economics and global power. However, unlike New York, 
since the beginning of China’s economic reforms  the country has developed a ‘particular kind of market 
economy that increasingly combines a neoliberal economy with authoritarian centralised control.’14  This 
is a complicated image and a double sided game highlighted by people like Joshua Cooper-Ramo, who 
argues that both positive and negative views of China are linked to it.  
Positive views tend to be associated with the country’s rapid economic growth and opportunities relating 
to the free market. However, contradictory concerns about poverty, human rights, corruption and 
ARCHITECTURE_MEDIA_POLITICS_SOCIETY         Vol. 2, no.1.    January 2013 
 
 
  
 
5 
 
exploitation are connected to the same market reform processes and its backdrop of political 
authoritarianism. In order for China to control its image, and thus ensure that it remains positive, the 
country needs an image that is powerful enough to deflect its underlying reality. This issue is of such 
fundamental importance to the future that Cooper-Ramo suggests that it will actually ‘determine the 
future of Chinese development and reform.’15  For Cooper-Ramo, the way in which the country will 
develop in the future will be intrinsically linked to internal and external consensus it can forge, and the 
way it is perceived internally and externally will be central to that. 
As a conspicuous channel through which to gain global prestige and attention, the Beijing Olympics was 
seized upon as an opportunity to rebrand the country and the city. Through the Olympics, resources were 
invested into reconfiguring the host city materially, in a way that would boost symbolic capital, concepts 
of modernity, and ensure an image of global capitalist integration. Externally, this all contributes to the 
creation of a positive image that will facilitate the country’s continued integration into the network of 
international capital investment. Internally, these developments were also used to forge an image of the 
country as one that was moving forward together, and through consensus. The ‘positive image’ of the 
Olympics themselves was important in this regard in that the positive values of the ‘Olympic ideals’ 
could also be interwoven into internal discourses about the benefits of modernisation. This was important 
to garner support for the specific developments associated with the Olympics, but was also important in 
creating a more positive climate for the social and economic changes required by China’s neoliberalising 
agenda more generally; an agenda resulting in ever greater social and economic inequalities from which 
the Olympics could be seen as merely a distraction and a smokescreen. 
 
 Olympic Beijing: Harmonious Society or Fantasy City?  
In 2005 Prime Minister Hu Jintao sought to boost China’s image by implementing a domestic social 
policy called ‘Harmonious Society’; a social policy guideline aimed at establishing the image of societal 
balance and unity in China. It has been widely speculated that this nationalist discourse was developed in 
response to the widening wealth gap; its function being to ease the possibility of social and political 
unrest and to justify the suppression of dissent. As a form of political theatre, Harmonious Society was 
central to China’s Olympic quest16 as it resonated with the 2004 Olympic Charter and Code of Ethics, that 
now seeks to emphasise ‘the preservation of human rights, unity and harmony’. This association played a 
part in China’s Olympic bid, but it also gave the Harmonious Society policy greater credibility inside 
China by appropriating the more ‘independent’ Olympic ideals. This in turn allowed the government to 
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justify some of the more unpalatable consequences of Olympic urban developments and, furthermore, 
allowed the ‘new State spaces’ such as the Olympic Stadium (Birds Nest), the Watercube, the National 
Theatre (the Egg), and the CCTV Tower, to be presented as internally beneficial and not wholly designed 
according to the needs of external visitors and the international media.  
The new ‘State spaces’ generated symbolic capital that was circulated globally through the currency of 
images that recreated the ‘official’ version of the city for the world’s media. Each state sponsored mega-
construction, although unique in style, shared internationally branded design credentials, hyper modern 
‘sci-fi’ aesthetics, and the image defining ‘soft power’ objectives of ‘image creation.’ The Egg was 
completed in 2007 despite protests about its price tag, which was estimated at ten times the government’s 
annual spending on poverty alleviation.17 The director of this grandiose architectural project described it 
as ‘a concrete example of China’s rising soft power and comprehensive national strength,’18 and thus 
suggested that its powerful image-text implications outweighed the problem of its cost. Along with 
Beijing Airport’s Terminal 3, ‘these “statescrafts” indicated the emergence of a new kind of state space; 
space produced by global flows of architectural design which accommodate state functions and articulate 
national ambitions.’19  
 
 
'The Egg' (Beijing National Theatre). Opened 2007. Architect: Paul Andreu 
 
Speaking a language of power and wealth, these projects reduced Beijing to what Hannigan refers to as an 
archetypal ‘Fantasy City’;20 a city made up of fragments of an urban landscape that are ‘theme-centric,’ 
aggressively branded and selectively preserve the local and historic in ways generally tied to their profit-
making potential. The result was the kind of spectacle that can attract and accommodate tourism, 
international investment and consumption, and an increase in service industries. However, it was also a 
spectacle completely at odds with the Harmonious Society discourse; the design of architectural 
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spectacles that meet the needs and desires of visitors, rather than the accommodation of the practical 
needs of the Chinese people, being the exact opposite of a discourse aimed at promoting societal unity 
and harmony.21   
In this sense, Beijing 2008 was typical of all Olympics up until the 2012 Games in London, and falls into 
line with Gavin Poynter’s 2006 study on the urban Olympic legacy. This suggests that the Olympics are 
often used as a vehicle for a wider process of social engineering and regeneration already taking place in a 
host city.22 In particular, he claims that hosting the Olympics fits in well with the objectives of a typical 
de-industrialising city and the political and economic restructuring these cities require in that process. As 
clearly indicated by these buildings, the Beijing case was no different and it was a perfect vehicle through 
which to continue restructuring the city, and the nation, along the lines of neoliberal consumption 
policies. 
 
Capturing the disappearing hutong: Counter Narratives and the Documentary Impulse 
Historically, much of the centre of Beijing was residential courtyard housing, set in densely populated 
hutong (alleyway) districts. Since the beginning of the reform period China’s real estate industry has 
become, according to the Geneva based Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions, the fastest growing and 
most profitable sector of the nation’s economy.23  Consequently, hutong residents have found themselves 
sitting on prime real estate and, as a result, land has been swiftly sold to private developers, residents have 
been relocated, and communities dispersed. COHRE statistics show that between 1999 and 2002, 
households affected by demolitions in Beijing went up threefold and that this sharp rise in demolition was 
directly related to the city’s Olympic bid. The report also estimates that of the 1.5 million people affected 
by demolition and forced eviction between 2000 and 2008, around 300,000 were pushed into poverty, or 
deeper poverty.  Clearly, this was not an image that fitted well with Beijing’s narrative of a Harmonious 
Society, or that of the hypermodern, prosperous global city of the new State spaces. However, according 
to the COHRE, it not only occurred in the case of Beijing, but is a repeated narrative that is typical of all 
Olympics.  
Despite the presence of these counter narratives and arguments, nothing of the dissent created by the 
Olympics in Beijing appeared in the press. Speaking about state media censorship and demolition, 
journalist Liu Ming explained that “we are not allowed to report disputes and protests related to 
redevelopment. That is seen as bad for social stability.” As in many cases of urban development in 
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neoliberalising economies, such efforts to censor ‘unofficial’ views were strengthened by the official 
language used to promote regeneration as progressive and as benefitting society as a whole.24  This 
careful choice of wording is just one more way in which the media is involved in garnering social 
cohesion, ensuring that the legitimacy of any protest is undermined, if not completely silenced.25  
Despite such subtle censorship and more obvious restrictions on the freedom of expression, assembly and 
association, there were grassroots attempts to challenge the official image of Olympic Beijing. A case in 
point was a series of Beijing documentaries, one example of which was Miao Wang’s 2010, Beijing Taxi. 
Such documentaries, that fall into the category of China’s ‘New Documentary Movement’ complicated 
Beijing’s official, Olympic narrative, by provoking audiences into considering the Olympics as a complex 
political phenomenon.26 These critical documentaries were significant, particularly considering the 
historical context of mainstream Chinese documentary which, during the ‘socialist realist’ heyday of the 
Mao era, took the form of propaganda newsreels projected prior to feature films. These films served the 
purpose of communicating the mainstream political ideology of the State through Leninist political 
visualisation but, since the reform period they have been replaced by television in this regard.27   
Most televised documentaries of this form were popular human-interest stories; a genre that has had 
considerable market success in the reform years. However, these state sanctioned documentaries continue 
to be highly ideological and, despite being more individualistic than the collectivised themes of historic 
socialist realism, their form and content is still officially contained.  The films of the New Documentary 
Movement however, working illegally outside of the State system, have developed a connection to 
Chinese communities that exist on the periphery of official representation. As communities in dense 
urban areas were being destroyed, this movement became an important actor in the ‘preservation’ of the 
built environment. It is a phenomenon that has been termed the ‘documentary impulse.’  
Based upon what can be identified as the key principles of memory, testimony, preservation and protest, 
this impulse to record disappearing urban environments set the New Documentary Movement apart from 
mainstream ‘official’ productions. Lu Xinyu claims that the use of the image to offer critical 
interpretation, instead of dictating opinions and feelings, makes these films socially and politically 
groundbreaking. She claims that the film makers involved in the movement are motivated by creating a 
‘vision of reality’ through a style and technique that contrasts with the old socialist realist documentaries, 
and contemporary officially sanctioned special topic programmes. She describes the movement as ‘one of 
the most important cultural phenomena in contemporary China.’28  
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The Da Zha Lan Project 
The documentary impulse and obsession with preserving the built environment through image in the 
build-up to the Olympics, was the catalyst for a community film project located in Beijing’s Da Zha Lan 
district; an inner city area south of Tiananmen Square made up of pre-Revolution courtyard housing and 
set along traditional hutong alleyways. Ancient hutong properties all over Beijing were redistributed 
following the revolution when housing was treated as a welfare issue for the first time.29  Despite this, 
some areas were also victims of Mao Zedong’s efforts to modernise Beijing with Soviet-style residential 
apartments and, as a result, the number of hutong communities had already fallen prior to the Olympics 
and the latest wave of demolitions. The hutong communities that do remain in Beijing now are poor, 
slum-like conglomerations that are densely populated, but which still bustle with local enterprise; many 
courtyard homes are also the location of small businesses such as restaurants and shops.  Da Zha Lan is a 
typical hutong locality and is described on the Da Zha Lan Project’s website thus: 
According to the Investigation of Urban Corners in Beijing, published in July 2005 by the 
Beijing Social Science Institute, the density of population in Da Zha Lan reaches 4,500 heads per 
square kilometer. It is extremely crowded and there are too many old houses in danger. The 
potential of fire is severe and there is an inadequate supply of water and electricity. Conditions of 
hygiene are appalling and public security is chaotic. There is an overflow of fake products and a 
high number of immigrants. Their daily living expenses are less than RMB 8. Da Zha Lan has 
become a typical slum.30 
These slum-like conditions are generally cited as the justification for the current wave of demolitions of 
this type of hutong but, in reality, it is often little more than an excuse to legitimise new private 
redevelopments.  This has contributed to the phenomenon known as of ‘commodity housing’; the 
acquisition of state-owned housing stock by private developers that began after the 1991 Demolition 
Regulation, allowed local authorities to issue demolition permits without seeking the resident’s consent.31  
In the case of Da Zha Lan, the hutong has received particular attention from city developers due to its 
proximity to Qianmen; a gentrified tourist location close to Tiananmen Square.  
Meishi Street is situated parallel to Qianmen’s newly redeveloped shopping street and leads north to the 
Olympic Stadium along the city’s central axis. It was on Meishi Street that Da Zha Lan Project’s film 
makers’ discovered Zhang Jinli; a resident who refused to leave his home despite the threat of impending 
ARCHITECTURE_MEDIA_POLITICS_SOCIETY         Vol. 2, no.1.    January 2013 
 
 
  
 
10 
 
demolition ‘to improve traffic and facilities for the 2008 Olympic Games.’32  In aiming to capture a 
personal and street level perspective of the demolitions, the Project’s leader, director Ou Ning, provided 
Zhang Jinli with a camera. The majority of the footage in the resulting documentary, entitled Meishi 
Street, was filmed by Zhang. Blurring the line between film-maker and subject, this type of documentary 
is key to empowering the local people affected by the upheavals that have resulted from the Olympics and 
the neoliberal changes in China generally. In line with the general ethos of the New Documentary 
Movement, this can be seen as an innovative way of emancipating the image of Beijing from the powers 
of official representation, rebranding, and image maintenance; all of which increasingly meet the 
neoliberalist demands and soft power interests of corporations and the state. This idea of emancipating the 
image also resonates with Lu Xinyu’s ‘vision of reality’; the idea of freeing the image from old 
ideological narratives and allowing it to be left open to uncontrolled interpretation. 
Both these ideas are clearly present in Meishi Street’s opening scenes; a montage of long take shots on 
what appears to be an average day in a local hutong neighbourhood. Without any voiceover narration, 
dialogue, or other narrative technique to link the individual images, each shot of the street seems to stand 
alone, leaving the viewer distanced through mere observation. It is only after these opening images that 
the subject of the documentary, Zhang Jinli, emerges from a manhole and chats to his neighbours who are 
standing nearby. With no description of the scene, or interaction with the residents, the audience only has 
the images to interpret. The lighting and sound are natural, there is no music and the use of long takes 
ensures editing does not determine tone. Instead, the audience is presented with a sense of ‘visual reality.’ 
What follows is a slightly more provocative montage of images beginning with Zhang Jinli’s half 
demolished home and several long take shots of other houses along the same street, in similar states of 
disrepair. These naturalistic images of brick piles, slum like conditions and half demolished homes are in 
stark contrast to the spectacular television images of official Olympic Beijing. In place of the fantasy of 
Olympic Beijing, Zhang’s locally constructed images present us the destruction of a reality. 
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Meishi Street (2006) courtesy of Icarus Films 
 
Writing on the City 
The idea of local empowerment through the production of counter images and counter narratives comes 
into play ten minutes into the film when Zhang Jinli is handed the camera. Zhang’s involvement in 
decisions around content of the final cut is not apparent. However, it is clear that Zhang uses the camera 
as a way of involving his community in the creation of a local counter narrative to the city’s Olympic 
development by recording the testimonies of people being forced to leave their homes. Filming his home 
and the surrounding built environment is a part of that testimony and Zhang Jinli claims that it is a 
“memento”; a reminder for when the community is finally dispersed and the buildings are all gone. When 
this day comes he says, he can watch the film and remember. 
It is also clear that Zhang wishes the film to bear witness to his long-term struggle to save his home from 
demolition. Refusing to leave without sufficient compensation, Zhang’s home is colloquially termed a 
“nail-in” house; the name given to a property left standing in a demolished area when a resident refuses to 
leave. Zhang’s protest is at the crux of the narrative and he turns his struggle for language, performance 
and representation, into the raison d'etre of the film. This is evident in his fetishisation of the protest 
banners he hangs from the exterior of his home, and in his appropriation of official modes of performative 
political language and communication. 
Historically, banners have been used in public spaces in China to carry promotional socialist slogans and 
guidelines. In recent years they have also been used to generate public support and co-operation for 
changes to the urban environment, particularly large scale demolition programmes such as that 
threatening Zhang’s home. The following three government banners hung in Meishi Street were captured 
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in the film: 
Relocating people in strict accordance with the law, promoting preservation of neighbourhood features. 
In unison, the people support and participate actively in city government projects. 
Strengthening city management, building a pleasant home together. 
In response to these messages, and the authorities’ use of public space to communicate their ‘Harmonious 
Society’ propaganda, Zhang offers his own protest banners which carry their own public discourse, and 
which are displayed upon the very property that he is being evicted from: 
To build a Harmonious Society, the government and common people must use law and reason. 
The demolition and removal company has falsified agreements. The Bureau of Land Resources has broken the law in 
its mediation. The ordinary people are powerless and finding it hard to survive. 
The demolition and removal company has falsified documents.  
Zhang’s creative use of banners as a form of protest is a performative act that defies the State’s 
suppression of assembly and freedom of speech. By literally writing messages on the city, he can be seen 
to be reclaiming control over the changing image of the landscape. But what is most interesting is that his 
banners attract an audience; they are a powerful act of showing. In addition, Zhang’s almost obsessive 
filming of his banners transforms them into fetishised images for media consumption, enabling this 
counter image to be taken out of its locality. Zhang also focuses attention on the public participation and 
observation of his protest by recording people’s responses and gazes upwards at the spectacle he creates. 
In doing so, he highlights the power of the ‘act of showing.’ As with the State orchestrated spectacle, the 
power of his activism is in the construction of spectacle: in other people looking at him. Neither the State 
nor Zhang have any power without an audience.  
 
What Would Mao Do? 
Writing on the city is an act of empowerment; an act of reclaiming the image of urban space, and an act 
that challenges the control of the elite over public discourse. De Certeau reminds us that reading is not a 
passive act, but rather an active engagement that can be appropriated though interpretation. Zhang shows 
an awareness of this through his deliberate reinterpretation of government propaganda messages that turn 
his banners into an act of political subversion. To accompany the banners on the exterior of his house, 
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Zhang has also posted several handwritten ‘newspaper’ articles. These are accompanied by pictures of 
Chairman Mao Zedong in a variety of different poses which explain, in detail, the injustices that Zhang 
has suffered at the hands of demolition and removal companies, as well as the reluctance of local 
government to intervene. Along with a picture of Chairman Mao waving to the crowds he has written: 
“Chairman Mao stands on the platform at Tiananmen Square and observes the demolition work on Meishi 
Street.”  
To accompany a picture of Chairman Mao, this time reading, he has written the words: “Chairman Mao 
looks at demolition and removal documents and says; citizen’s legal rights to property cannot be trampled 
on.” With his innovative invention of political propaganda, Zhang is making a claim for the ownership of 
local public discourse. He is also highlighting the performative nature of the written media by emulating 
propaganda newspaper narratives that use provocative images and emotive language. Zhang is not 
protesting by directly challenging the system, but rather, is attempting to shame it into intervening. In 
short he asks; what Would Mao Do?  Zhang’s appeal emphasises what Harvey refers to in contemporary 
China as the worker’s moral claim for the ‘traditional Maoist notion of the masses […] whose interests 
were harmonious with each other and also with those of the state.’33  It is an appeal and a performance 
that throws the Harmonious Society discourse into relief by calling upon, and reworking history, in ways 
that do not align with current State intentions. 
As the built environment was being twisted out of all recognition, Zhang’s appeal to the past also 
suggested both anxiety and nostalgia and, in this sense, reminds us of Braester. In particular, they recall 
Braester’s argument that human history and memory are so deeply ingrained in the built environment that, 
“in the absence of familiar landmarks, they become unanchored.”34  As Beijing was being reconfigured 
by ‘transnational architectural production,’‘the local past’ (as opposed to ‘the national past’) was being 
marginalised and could only survive if it could be tied to the accommodation of touristic expectations. For 
Zhang then, it was not just a building or a street that was being demolished and replaced by an external 
commodity imposition, it was human history and personal memory.  
Zhang’s attempts to stave off this erasure were emotively captured in his film’s final scene. Bearing 
witness to the act of demolition of Zhang’s home, this scene is characterised by erratic camera 
movements as he holds his camera high above his head in an attempt to scan the scene of the demolition. 
The shaky camerawork captures his feelings of despair and lack of control as the reason for his long 
protest comes to an end and his home, his memories and his history, are destroyed. In this scene, we are 
witness to Zhang’s last attempt to capture the injustice of his forced removal and his last attempt to 
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protest through showing. It is not only an emotional piece of filmmaking, but an important historical 
document that captures the end of one of Beijing’s oldest and most traditional neighbourhoods, its urban 
structures, its communities and its architecture.  
 
Where two realities collide: The ‘Disneyfication’ of history 
From the rubble of Zhang’s site of resistance grew a transient, hybrid space that embodies both the past 
and the future. Zhang’s locality was reconfigured around the needs of the tourist and, today, Qianmen is a 
busy shopping district in the form of a ‘Disneyfied historic downtown.’35  It is a key project in the hyper-
gentrification of Beijing’s heritage sites and is symptomatic of the Olympic urban legacy as a whole. 
Once an Imperial commercial district, Qianmen now invites tourists to explore its ‘traditional’ courtyard 
shops, many of which have been demolished and redeveloped in replica; something that can also be seen 
as another mode of ‘transnational architectural production.’ With much of the old slum-like hutong 
cleared, Qianmen and the surrounding Da Zha Lan, has become a sanitised, newly built environment that 
emulates a controlled, culturally specific heritage site that can be easily digested by the global spectator. 
To the visitor, this is a fleeting space of commoditised nostalgia and hyper-consumption. By contrast, to 
the residents, it is a space that no longer caters to their economic, social, or spatial needs. Even those who 
were not physically relocated due to the earlier demolitions are under threat of being economically 
displaced in the future, as the economy of the area looks ever more toward the global market.   
Such stories were repeated across the city in the build up to the Olympics and, in today’s China, are still 
being repeated across the country as the government continues to promote rapid and thorough 
modernisation. Across Beijing, the Olympic and non-Olympic related investment in infrastructural 
development over the past decade has, as in the specific case of Da Zha Lan, transformed the visual image 
of the city at large. Further afield it has helped create a new national identity resonant of modern global 
ambitions36 which turn their back on the traditional poor of China and focus attention on the one sided 
benefits of the neoliberal reform period. In this sense, Olympic Beijing is a perfect example of the use of 
architecture as a form of ‘soft power’ persuasion technique that has managed to transform the nation’s 
image with apparently lasting effect. Both during and long after the Olympics, the global media was 
saturated with images of new Beijing; from its transnational architectural skyline with its megalomaniac 
proportions, to its new spaces of consumption, all of which were built at the cost of people like Zhang 
Jinli.  
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Despite the apparently thorough imposition of this new image of Beijing through its architecture, and the 
concentration of the world’s media on that architecture, Zhang’s images of resistance continue to 
stubbornly preserve the old buildings that used to stand in Meishi Street. Indeed, his film represents one 
of the few memories left of the city’s previous life and they thus offer us one of the few genuine remnants 
of an old, pre-Disney Beijing that continues to change and grow along neoliberal lines of development. It 
is in the images of his film, and other films like it, that ‘real’ architectural history collides with Disney. In 
the future, this film, and others of its ilk, may be the only places where the ‘real’ old architecture of 
Beijing exists. To use de Certeau’s terminology; these optical artefacts on film may be the closest we 
come to historic architectural reality.  
What all of this reveals is a complex relationship between architecture, history and the media. On the one 
hand, modern Olympic Beijing can be interpreted as an architectural simulacrum; a physically constructed 
spectacle. However, it can also be read as a mediated spectacle; a backdrop for television images intended 
to promote Beijing, and China in general, to a world of capital investment opportunities. On the other 
hand, it reveals the continued presence of an uncomfortable architectural and social reality in China, that 
continues to exist despite the huge material investments in infrastructure and urban developments 
witnessed in the last decade and more. Further to this, it reveals an alternative role for the media in the 
preservation of this historic reality.  
Rather than being a mere vehicle for the presentation of the modern architectural spectacle to an uncritical 
world audience then, film becomes the conduit for the presentation of a hidden and seemingly shameful 
truth; the continued existence of poverty and a set of values that questions the neoliberal agenda of the 
current government. Seen in this light, the relationship between film and architecture, and by extension, 
society and politics, becomes a double sided game that is as complex and contradictory as China’s own 
development; part capitalist free market liberalism, and part neo-authoritarian socialism. In both cases, 
architecture becomes intrinsically interwoven into a media dialogue and, indeed, becomes a form of 
media in itself. In the first instance, it is an object of visual entertainment that exists for the production of 
spectacular images, whilst in the second, architecture becomes an object of disappearance that only 
remains tangible through the filmic image. Architecture is not just recorded on film, it only exists on film.  
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